#### The AFF’s approach to reduction of the natural world to a means of securing energy enframes existence, stripping beings of their very essence.

Beckman 0

[Tad, Harvey Mudd College, “Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,” [http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html] //](http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html%5D%20//) myost

To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a "challenging-forth," what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of techne in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors? Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. [(7)](http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html#N_7_) As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit." {[7], p. 14} This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs. The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of techne humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. (8)

#### The aff’s myopic focus on technical solutions to climate change trades off with other environmental concerns—only alt can solve the root cause

Crist 7

[Eileen, Associate Professor of Science and Technology Studies in the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at Virginia Tech, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse” Telos 141 Winter 2007] // myost

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### Depictions of Middle Eastern crises are rooted in a Western "expert knowledge" of the Middle East – their claims to rational truth naturalize and reinforce power relations and are founded in assumptions that make domination inevitable

Munif 6

[Yasser, PhD Candidate in sociology at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, “Media is The Continuation of War by Other Means,” *MIT E-Journal of Middle East Studies* (Summer) 6: 126-141] // myost

Third, an understanding of the way Islam has been constructed within the Western imaginary constitutes an important entry point for any exploration of mainstream media in the US. As Edward Said argues, rhetoric about “the Islamic threat” has been occupying a central position in the media since the Iranian revolution of 1979. In Covering Islam, he writes: When the NYT explains a surprisingly strong Iranian resistance to Iraq’s incursion, it resorts to a formula about the “Shi’a penchant for martyrdom.” Superficially, phrases like that have certain plausibility, but in fact I think they are used to cover a great deal of what the reporter knows nothing about. Not knowing the language is only part of a much greater ignorance, for often enough the reporter is sent to a strange country with no preparation or experience, just because he or she is canny at picking up things quickly or happens already to be in the general vicinity of where front-page news is happening.11 Said shows that journalistic knowledge about people living in the periphery of “the West” is usually based on an Orientalist narrative, defined in opposition to Western national identity. The nation is not solely a collection of “authentic” characteristics found within the metropole, it is also determined by an assemblage of what it is not, i.e. it defines itself in opposition to its Other. “The West” and “the Orient” can be considered relational concepts that are frequently constructed through the negation of one another: “The West” is what “the Orient” is not and vice versa. However, this oppositional relationship is also crucial to map the matrix of power to understand how identities are defined and according to whose interests. Said reminds us that Orientalism is a form of power/knowledge used by “the West” to control, structure, and dominate “the Orient.” Orientalism, as an ontology, creates on the one hand a rational, civilized, Christian, democratic and just “West” and on the other, an irrational, exotic, erotic, Islamic, and despotic “East.” Orientalism, as an epistemology, perpetuates a relationship of unevenness between “the Orient” and “the West” and it legitimizes domination which becomes common-sensical with time. Many institutions reproduce the Orientalist historiography by constructing “expert” knowledge according to assumptions that do not question the foundations of European modernity.

#### This outweighs and turns the case - the knowledge apparatus of Western policy thinking is the root cause of Middle East instability and makes global extinction inevitable

Bilgin 5

[Pinar, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University in Turkey, *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective*, p. 164-165] // myost

Thinking about the future from a critical security perspective need not be limited to ' desired' futures only. Students of security could also try and shape the future by pointing to what some futures may bring if no preventive action is taken in the present – as Ulrich Beck has done in Risk Society (1992). According to Beck, if threats to security are 'threats to the future', as is the case with many environmental threats (such as depletion of natural resources), then, it is imperative that they be addressed in the present. For, through our past decisions about atomic energy and our present decisions about the use of genetic technology, human genetics, nanotechnology and computer science, we unleash unforeseeable, uncontrollable, indeed even, incommunicable consequences that threaten life on earth. (Beck 2003: 257) ‘As conjectures, as threats to the future, as prognoses, [such threats] have and develop a practical relevance to preventive actions', notes Beck (1992:34). However, one problem with trying to mobilise action to meet such threats is that they only exist in the future as conjectures. It is only through thinking and writing about such threats that one could raise peoples' awareness regarding what the future may bring, and what needs to be done in the present to prevent them from happening. When issues such as threats to the environment are concerned, thinking (and writing) about the future becomes crucial; otherwise they have the potential to cause destruction on 'such a scale that action afterwards would be practically impossible' (Beck 1992: 34). Although Beck's thesis is about the environment, the points he makes in explaining the way human agency has been complicit, via the production of knowledge, in exacerbating (if not creating) 'threats to the future' could be adopted and adapted to further develop the critique students of critical security present of prevailing security discourses in general and US discourse on regional security in the Middle East in particular. Beck (1992: 183) writes: In contrast to all earlier epochs ... the risk society is characterized by a lack: the impossibility of an external attribution of hazards. In other words, risks depend on decisions ... Risks are the reflection of human actions and omissions, the expression of highly developed productive forces. That means that the sources of danger are no longer ignorance but knowledge, not a deficient but a perfected mastery over nature. Beck's point is made "within the context of environmental politics, where the grip of ‘scientific’ knowledge over practice is even stronger than in the less ‘scientific’ Security Studies. Nevertheless, as noted above, knowledge about the future, presented in terms of obstacles and opportunities, both constrains and informs actors' practices thereby helping constitute the future. Then, given the ways in which the Middle Eastern security discourse has, in the past, been complicit in shaping regional insecurity in the Middle East, it could be argued that uncritical adoption of existing knowledge produced by prevailing discourses that do not offer anything other than more of the same does itself constitute a ' threat to the future'. Accordingly, students of security who fail to reflect upon the self-constitutive potential of their thinking would be complicit in perpetuating regional insecurity in the Middle East.

#### The AFF’s representations of nuclear war as catastrophe render invisible the ongoing violence against the Fourth World. This de-historicization of nuclear conflict authorizes limitless violence and genocide.

Kato 93

[Masahide, Professor in Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu; “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Alternatives, Volume 18, Number 3, Summer 1993, pg. 347-349, ISSN 0304-3754. // Ether]

The vigorous invasion of the logic of capitalist accumulation into the last vestige of relatively autonomous space in the periphery under late capitalism is propelled not only by the desire for incorporating every fabric of the society into the division of labor but also by the desire for "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery." The penetration of capital into the social fabric and the destruction of nature and preexisting social organizations by capital are not separable. However, what we have witnessed in the phase of late capitalism is a rapid intensification of the destruction and extermination of the periphery. In this context, capital is no longer interested in incorporating some parts of the periphery into the international division of labor. The emergence of such "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery can be explained, at least partially, by another problematic of late capitalism formulated by Ernest Mandel: the mass production of the means of destruction." Particularly, the latest phase of capitalism distinguishes itself from the earlier phases in its production of the "ultimate" means of destruction/extermination, i.e., nuclear weapons. Let us recall our earlier discussion about the critical historical conjuncture where the notion of "strategy" changed its nature and became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry. Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historically contextualized. The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus given due recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whose meaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry, the nuclear catastrophe is confined to the realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery. And yet how can one deny the crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of "nuclear testing" since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo in 1945? As of 1991, 1,924 nuclear explosions have occurred on earth." The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are the United States (936 times), the former Soviet Union (715 times), France (192times), the United Kingdom (44 times), and China (36 times)." The primary targets of warfare ("test site" to use Nuke Speak terminology) have been invariably the sovereign nations of Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. Thus history has already witnessed the nuclear wars against the Marshall Islands (66 times), French Polynesia (175 times), Australian Aborigines (9 times), Newe Sogobia (the Western Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24 times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic of Kazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times)." Moreover, although I focus primarily on "nuclear tests" in this article, if we are to expand the notion of nuclear warfare to include any kind of violence accrued from the nuclear fuel cycle (particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japan and the European nations as perpetrators and add the Navaho, Havasupai and other Indigenous Nations to the list of targets. Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeit undeclared, has been waged against the Fourth World, and Indigenous Nations. The dismal consequences of "intensive exploitation," "low intensity intervention," or the "nullification of the sovereignty" in the Third World produced by the First World have taken a form of nuclear extermination in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. Thus, from the perspectives of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclear catastrophe has never been the "unthinkable" single catastrophe but the real catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity. Nevertheless, ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence, the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped out from the history and consciousness of the First World community. Such a discursive strategy that aims to mask the "real" of nuclear warfare in the domain of imagery of nuclear catastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth's Nuclear Playground, which extensively covers the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific: Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere . . . were global in effect. The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas of the fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. In preparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself. Although Firth's book is definitely a remarkablde study of the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the "nuclear explosions" and the nuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with the problematic use of the subject ("we") is located higher than the "real" of nuclear warfare in terms of discursive value. This ideological division/hierarchization is the very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliterated and hence legitimatized. The discursive containment/obliteration of the "real" of nuclear warfare has been accomplished, ironic as it may sound, by nuclear criticism. Nuclear criticism, with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the unshakable authority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclear catastrophe happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis.

#### The AFF’s ontology reduces the world to “Standing Reserve” to be called upon as it benefits the Self and refuses to value the world as anything else. This renders all beings objects—setting the tone for global warfare.

Zimmerman 81

[Michael E. Zimmerman, Tulane University. *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity*. 220-224.] // myost

In 1951 Heidegger noted that Spengler's idea of the "decline of the West" is "only the negative, though correct, consequence of Nietzsche's word, 'the wasteland grows'." (WHO, 14/38) Spengler's estimation is negative because it only describes the symptoms of decay, not the origins. Recalling the destruction caused by World War II, Heidegger asserted that the present spiritual devastation is more uncanny than physical destruction. "The devastation of the earth can easily go hand in hand with a guaranteed supreme living standard for [humans], and just as easily with the organized establishment of a uniform state of happiness for all [humanity]." (WHO, 11/29-30) He denied that he was part of the "chorus of voices" which condemned the "sickness" of Europe. While some writers took the easy road of describing the absurdity of modern life, Heidegger sought to discover the source of this absurdity. This source turns out to be: our destiny to understand ourselves as absolute subjects in a universe of commodities. Life in such a world cannot help but be absurd or, to use Heidegger's early terminology, inauthentic. Although technological culture is supposedly our destiny, Heidegger is not pleased with its traits—the self-sustaining, constantly expanding, and ultimately aimless systems of mass production and consumption; power politics; global warfare; mass-culture; and the collapse of great art, literature, philosophy, and religion. Already in "The Age of the World Picture" (1938), he writes that once the world becomes a mere picture (Bild) for the human subject, men contend for the "right" to organize the picture as it suits them. There arises the struggle of "world views," for whose sake "man brings into play his unlimited power for the calculating, planning, and molding of all things. Science as research is an absolutely necessary form of this establishing of self in the world...." (Hw, 87/135) Each competing world-view declares that its system of values best promotes human life; that is, the life of the people of the nation promoting the particular world-view. Values become nothing more than the "objectification of needs as goals." (Hw, 94/142) Refusing to acknowledge anything transcendent, nation-states try to dominate each other in their quest for markets, raw material, and "Lebensraum." Anything which enhances the power of the state, including the politicalization of education, art, religion, and science, is justified. (Nil, 28, 362-363) Production and consumption are, of course, organized as part of the push for total power. In a public lecture in 1939, Heidegger said that people expect that this drive for power necessarily establishes life-enhancing values, as if total mobilization were something in itself and not the organization of unconditioned senselessness for and from the Will to Power. Such power-empowering positings no longer direct themselves according to "masses" and "ideals," which could still be grounded in themselves; they stand "In the service" of the pure expansion of power and are evaluated only according to the thus esteemed economic value. The age of fulfilled senselessness is thus the time of the power-like discovery and accomplishment of "world-views," which drive all reckoning of re-presenting and re-producing [Vor- and Herstellens] to the uttermost extreme, because according to their essence they arise from a self-posited self-directing of mankind into beings and its [humankind's] unconditioned domination over all means of power of the earth and over [the earth] itself. (Nil, 21-22) The analysis of the clash of world-views was directed primarily against Germany under National Socialism, but against other Western nations as well. This is evident in a comment Heidegger made in 1940 concerning how one nation "justifies" all actions, so long as they promote greater power: "For example, if the English thoroughly blast the French fleet anchored in the harbor of Oran, this is from their power-standpoint wholly 'justified' [gerecht]; for 'justified' means only: what is useful for power-enhancement." (Nil, 198) This remarkable statement anticipated by almost two years the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. The statement was made around the time Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland for reasons of "national security." When Heidegger said in 1951 that World War II "decided nothing" (WHO, 65/166), he did not mean that it was unimportant for Hitler to have been defeated. His point was that world wars arc only offshoots of the industrialization and "planetary imperialism" (Hw, 102/152-153) which are the key symptoms of the modem age. In a marginal note found in his own copy of his "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger wrote: "Industrial society as the authoritative subject-and thinking as 'politics'."13 World wars are ways of shoring up faltering economies; wars provide "the stability of a constant form of using things up." Leaders of power-hungry nations are not merely individuals caught up in the "blind rage of a selfish egoism," but are instruments of world-destiny. (VA, I, 84-85/104-105) Everything is planned for the sake of accelerating the process of production and consumption, as Ernst Jiinger pointed out in the 1920s.14 The push for power will finally lead to attempts to "breed" human beings in factories, because humans are the most important raw material. The increase in the number of masses of human beings is done explicitly by plan so that the opportunity will never run out for claiming more "room to live" for the large masses whose size then requires correspondingly higher masses of human beings for their arrangement. This circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption is the sole procedure which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an unworld. (VA, I, 88/107) The Will to Power manifests itself primarily, therefore, in economic terms. Self-willed man turns everything into a commodity. [Man] himself, along with everything else, is turned into a "calculated market value" of a world-wide market. (Hw, 270/114-115) Heidegger was aware of the international corporations which ignore national boundaries in the search for cheaper material, labor, and new markets.15 In the world run by corporate interests, everyday life becomes the effort to succeed in the marketplace. (Hw, 290/136) Heidegger sounds like Marx in saying: Self-willed man reckons everywhere with things and men as with objects. What is so reckoned becomes merchandise. Everything is constantly changed about into new orders.... Self-assertive man lives by staking his will. He lives essentially by risking his essence [Wesen] in the vibration of money and the currency [Geltens] of values. As the constant trader and middleman, man is the "merchant." He weighs and measures constantly, yet does not know the real weight of things. He also does not know what in himself has authentic weight [Gewicht] and prevails [iiberwiegt]. (Hw, 289/135) Everyday life is determined according to the demands of the economic system. In this hectic world, we no longer understand death, pain, or love. (Hw, 253/96) We are uprooted and alienated; great masses move across continents in search of "better opportunities," "personal improvement," and a "higher standard of living"; the self disappears in the process of production (ZSF, 74/75); rivers and streams become sewers; the air is poisoned; forests are annihilated; mountains are flattened for their ore, or to make room for highways; farms become "agri-business" operations which degrade the soil with the imposition of artificial fertilizers and pesticides; homes become high-rise apartment complexes; work becomes repetitive, simplified, and boring; biochemists study how to manipulate man's genetic structure; and all of this happens under the aegis of self-development, self-emancipation, and progress. No human action can bring about a change in the technological impulse, for "Self-assertive [human]...is the functionary of Technik." (Hw, 271/116)16 The momentum of the technological Will to Power has outstripped [humanity's] capacity to control it. (G, 19/51) Before World War II, Heidegger speculated that "Before Being can occur in its primal truth, Being as the will must be broken, the world must be forced to collapse and the earth must be driven to desolation, and [human] to mere labor." (VI, I, 65/86) But even the devastation of the wars did not essentially change the situation in the modern world. Human life in the technological age bears important similarities to what Heidegger called "inauthentic everydayness" in Being and Time. There he suggested that inauthenticity resulted when an individual chose to conceal the truth. In his later work, he argues that inauthenticity reigns because humanity has become the self-certain subject who yearns to dominate everything. Heidegger personifies the subject, talking as if it were a conscious agent manipulating individuals to act according to its dictates. He makes individuals appear to be functions of the subject in a way analogous to how Marx makes them appear to be functions of "Lord Capital." In Capital, we read: As the conscious bearer of this movement [of capital], the possessor of money becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which the money starts, and to which it returns. The objective content of the circulation we have been discussing—the valorization of value—is his subjective purpose, and it is only insofar as the appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e., as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and will. Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit of any single transaction. This boundless drive for enrichment, this passionate chase after value, is common to the capitalist and the miser, but while the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational miser.

#### The alternative is to do nothing. This isn't a question of passivity but of a releasement from the Will to Technology and an openness to the mystery of Being which transcends activity. Only such an ontological disarmament inaugurates new modes of revealing that don't depend on the world's subordination to human motivations.

McWhorter 92

[Ladelle McWhorter, University of Richmond. *Heidegger and the Earth: Issues in Environmental Philosophy*. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 1992. 3-7.] // myost

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call, and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do – nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox: how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."3 Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human. What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers - of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies - so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays - in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" - Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness - a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery’. It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery’ is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing. Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the revelation of new truths. Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world, is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing to light, or the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur. Revealing and concealing belong together. Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated.4 Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our forgetting is forgotten, and all traces of absence absent themselves from our world. The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, "The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe."5 Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed. This dream of Hawking's is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial Utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything. But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control-the mystery the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur. The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking - couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent - is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream. And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves - selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are, modernity - are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernity has posited it - as rationally self-interested individual, as self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent - is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age.

### Nuke Terrorism 1NC

#### No Al-Qaeda nukes – multiple warrants

**Mueller, 10** – Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science at Ohio State University [John, “Nuclear Weapons”, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb, Issue 177, p.38, proquest, AL]

"Al Qaeda Is Searching for a Nuclear Capability." Prove it. Al Qaeda may have had some interest in atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the 9/11 attacks. For instance, a man who defected from al Qaeda after he was caught stealing $110,000 from the organization- "a lovable rogue," "fixated on money," who "likes to please," as one FBI debriefer described Jamal al-Fadl - has testified that members tried to purchase uranium in the mid-1990s, though they were scammed and purchased bogus material. There are also reports that bin Laden had "academic" discussions about WMD in 2001 with Pakistani nuclear scientists who did not actually know how to build a bomb. But the Afghanistan invasion seems to have cut off any schemes. As analyst Anne Stenersen notes, evidence from an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan when the group beat a hasty retreat indicates that only some $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for WMD research, and that was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. For comparison, she points out that the Japanese millennia) terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, appears to have invested $30 million in its sarin gas manufacturing program. Milton Leitenberg of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland-College Park quotes Ayman al-Zawahiri as saying that the project was "wasted time and effort." Even former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector David Albright, who is more impressed with the evidence found in Afghanistan, concludes that any al Qaeda atomic efforts were "seriously disrupted"- indeed, "nipped in the bud"- by the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and that after the invasion the "chance of al Qaeda detonating a nuclear explosive appears on reflection to be low."

### Econ 1NC

#### Their projections are the same ones which failed to predict, and turn the case—the assumptions of a rational economic agent make collapse inevitable

Stiglitz 10

[Joseph, Columbia University, “Needed: a new economic paradigm,” 19 August 2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d5108f90-abc2-11df-9f02-00144feabdc0.html#axzz27bcq39SH>] // myost

The blame game continues over who is responsible for the worst recession since the Great Depression – the financiers who did such a bad job of managing risk or the regulators who failed to stop them. But the economics profession bears more than a little culpability. It provided the models that gave comfort to regulators that markets could be self-regulated; that they were efficient and self-correcting. The efficient markets hypothesis – the notion that market prices fully revealed all the relevant information – ruled the day. Today, not only is our economy in a shambles but so too is the economic paradigm that predominated in the years before the crisis – or at least it should be. It is hard for non-economists to understand how peculiar the predominant macroeconomic models were. Many assumed demand had to equal supply – and that meant there could be no unemployment. (Right now a lot of people are just enjoying an extra dose of leisure; why they are unhappy is a matter for psychiatry, not economics.) Many used “representative agent models” – all individuals were assumed to be identical, and this meant there could be no meaningful financial markets (who would be lending money to whom?). Information asymmetries, the cornerstone of modern economics, also had no place: they could arise only if individuals suffered from acute schizophrenia, an assumption incompatible with another of the favoured assumptions, full rationality. Bad models lead to bad policy: central banks, for instance, focused on the small economic inefficiencies arising from inflation, to the exclusion of the far, far greater inefficiencies arising from dysfunctional financial markets and asset price bubbles. After all, their models said that financial markets were always efficient. Remarkably, standard macroeconomic models did not even incorporate adequate analyses of banks. No wonder former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, in his famous mea culpa, could express his surprise that banks did not do a better job at risk management. The real surprise was his surprise: even a cursory look at the perverse incentives confronting banks and their managers would have predicted short-sighted behaviour with excessive risk-taking. The standard models should be graded on their predictive ability – and especially their ability to predict in circumstances that matter. Increasing the accuracy of forecast in normal times (knowing whether the economy will grow at 2.4 per cent or 2.5 per cent) is far less important than knowing the risk of a major recession. In this the models failed miserably, and the predictions of policymakers based on them have, by now, totally undermined their credibility. Policymakers did not see the crisis coming, said its effects were contained after the bubble burst, and thought the consequences would be far more short-lived and less severe than they have been. Fortunately, while much of the mainstream focused on these flawed models, numerous researchers were engaged in developing alternative approaches. Economic theory had already shown that many of the central conclusions of the standard model were not robust – that is, small changes in assumptions led to large changes in conclusions. Even small information asymmetries, or imperfections in risk markets, meant that markets were not efficient. Celebrated results, such as Adam Smith’s invisible hand, did not hold; the invisible hand was invisible because it was not there. Few today would argue that bank managers, in their pursuit of their self-interest, had promoted the well-being of the global economy. Monetary policy affects the economy through the availability of credit – and the terms on which it is made available, especially to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Understanding this requires us to analyse banks and their interaction with the shadow banking sector. The spread between the Treasury bill rate and lending rates can change markedly. With a few exceptions, most central banks paid little attention to systemic risk and the risks posed by credit interlinkages. Years before the crisis, a few researchers focused on these issues, including the possibility of the bankruptcy cascades that were to play out in such an important way in the crisis. This is an example of the importance of modelling carefully complex interactions among economic agents (households, companies, banks) – interactions that cannot be studied in models in which everyone is assumed to be the same. Even the sacrosanct assumption of rationality has been attacked: there are systemic deviations from rationality and consequences for macroeconomic behaviour that need to be explored. Changing paradigms is not easy. Too many have invested too much in the wrong models. Like the Ptolemaic attempts to preserve earth-centric views of the universe, there will be heroic efforts to add complexities and refinements to the standard paradigm. The resulting models will be an improvement and policies based on them may do better, but they too are likely to fail. Nothing less than a paradigm shift will do. But a new paradigm, I believe, is within our grasp: the intellectual building blocks are there and the Institute for New Economic Thinking is providing a framework for bringing the diverse group of scholars striving to create this new paradigm together. What is at stake, of course, is more than just the credibility of the economics profession or that of the policymakers who rely on their ideas: it is the stability and prosperity of our economies.

#### Collapse of the global economy is inevitable

Thomas Homer-Dixon, holds the Centre for International Governance Innovation Chair of Global Systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Ontario, and is a Professor in the Centre for Environment and Business in the Faculty of Environment, University of Waterloo, January/February 2011, “Unconventional Wisdom: ECONOMIES CAN'T JUST KEEP ON GROWING,” Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional\_wisdom?page=0,1

Humanity has made great strides over the past 2,000 years, and we often assume that our path, notwithstanding a few bumps along the way, goes ever upward. But we are wrong: Within this century, environmental and resource constraints will likely bring global economic growth to a halt. Limits on available resources already restrict economic activity in many sectors, though their impact usually goes unacknowledged. Take rare-earth elements -- minerals and oxides essential to the manufacture of many technologies. When China recently stopped exporting them, sudden shortages threatened to crimp a wide range of industries. Most commentators believed that the supply crunch would ease once new (or mothballed) rare-earth mines are opened. But such optimism overlooks a fundamental physical reality. As the best bodies of ore are exhausted, miners move on to less concentrated deposits in more difficult natural circumstances. These mines cause more pollution and require more energy. In other wordsfv, opening new rare-earth mines outside China will result in staggering environmental impact. Or consider petroleum, which provides about 40 percent of the world's commercial energy and more than 95 percent of its transportation energy. Oil companies generally have to work harder to get each new barrel of oil. The amount of energy they receive for each unit of energy they invest in drilling has dropped from 100 to 1 in Texas in the 1930s to about 15 to 1 in the continental United States today. The oil sands in Alberta, Canada, yield a return of only 4 to 1. Coal and natural gas still have high energy yields. So, as oil becomes harder to get in coming decades, these energy sources will become increasingly vital to the global economy. But they're fossil fuels, and burning them generates climate-changing carbon dioxide. If the World Bank's projected rates for global economic growth hold steady, global output will have risen almost tenfold by 2100, to more than $600 trillion in today's dollars. So even if countries make dramatic reductions in carbon emissions per dollar of GDP, global carbon dioxide emissions will triple from today's level to more than 90 billion metric tons a year. Scientists tell us that tripling carbon emissions would cause such extreme heat waves, droughts, and storms that farmers would likely find they couldn't produce the food needed for the world's projected population of 9 billion people. Indeed, the economic damage caused by such climate change would probably, by itself, halt growth. Humankind is in a box. For the 2.7 billion people now living on less than $2 a day, economic growth is essential to satisfying the most basic requirements of human dignity. And in much wealthier societies, people need growth to pay off their debts, support liberty, and maintain civil peace. To produce and sustain this growth, they must expend vast amounts of energy. Yet our best energy source -- fossil fuel -- is the main thing contributing to climate change, and climate change, if unchecked, will halt growth.

### More Environment Links

#### The AFF is rife with examples of a thematic framing of human beings as benevolent protectors of the environment – monitoring, manipulating and controlling nature to ensure it functions in a systematically predictable way. This is a dangerous illusion that promotes futile managerial approaches to an untameable natural world.

Kuletz 98

[Valerie Kuletz, University of Canterbury. *The Tainted Desert: Environmental and Social Ruin in the American West*. New York: Routledge, 1998. 285-287.] // myost

We have seen how comparing two sets of perceptions about the environment and their intellectual lineages—the traditional Indian (specifically, the Western Shoshone, Southern Paiute, and Owens Valley Paiute) and the Western scientific—illuminates the limitations of each perspective, while simultaneously placing the two discourses on equal epistemological footing in such a way that one does not dominate the other due to its greater political power, or, as Bourdieu would say, "cultural capital."2 In some respects, this balancing act is an artificial one since Euroamerican scientific representations of the region enjoy far more legitimacy and political prestige than those of the region's indigenous population. Nevertheless, moving from one view to the other assists us in opening intellectual horizons onto the diversity of knowledge about place and nature that exist in this desert region. Comparing the two knowledge systems shows how environmental science, as a discipline and as practiced at Yucca Mountain, exists within a specific cultural and political context (and is a product of a specific cultural tradition), in the same way that Indian traditional knowledge about environment exists within a cultural context. However, because environmental science is the dominant narrative, its truth claims are "naturalized," that is, taken out of their cultural context and perceived as self-evident, so much so the the narratives that science constructs about the natural world become resistant to critical scrutiny, especially from those outside the discipline itself.3 The brief history of ecology, and ecosystems ecology in particular, in Chapter 9 illuminates some of the cultural and political factors that influence the Euroamerican perception of nature and that inform the Yucca Mountain Project—factors that exclude alternative perspectives that might jeopardize the project's implied political objective. By examining these factors in the larger context, we begin to see the powerful role of metaphors in scientific knowledge productions. They reveal the unstated assumptions from which we grasp the natural world and interpret it. When we describe the extended Yucca Mountain region as an "outdoor laboratory," the experimental landscape becomes a metaphorical landscape as much as a material reality. Metaphoricity and materiality are not, for human beings, separate entities. In using language science situates itself within culture and manifests a cultural production. Cybernetic terminology imposes human mechanistic, electrochemical conceptualizations onto nature; to a large extent people comprehend nature through their cultural productions—texts and machines. In this respect nature is what we make it. The ecosystem perspective identifies nature with energy conceptualized as work, with productivity conceptualized as the capacity to produce consumable materials, and with efficiency—all words that help to build an industrial, cybernetic-oriented, and economistic society. As the metaphors used to describe natural processes change through time from Clements's organism to Odum's electro-chemical circuit machine, it becomes impossible not to see our current late industrial, technocratic society reflected in our science. Today, the environmental economic discourse on productivity, with its organization of ecosystems according to capacities of "worldwide annual gross primary production"4 (see Figure 9.5) places Yucca Mountain as exceedingly low in the hierarchy of productivity, and thus deems it appropriate for nuclear waste disposal. But whose "productivity" are we talking about? Certainly not that of the Western Shoshone or Southern Paiute who have subsisted on the mountain's plants, animals, and water and who value the land in quite a different way. Science relies heavily on metaphors when representing nature.5 Ecology and, more specifically, the concept of the ecosystem are no exceptions. Here, economic and social metaphors proliferate to describe and explain nature. Many of these linguistic terms are politically motivated and are assertions of the status quo (stability, functionalist order, capitalist economics). Ironically, today, Indian pronouncements about nature are often dismissed as politically motivated. Why isn't such a phrase as "productive hierarchy" not seen as politically and culturally motivated, crafted to organize nature according to consumer interests? Indians claim that the land is sacred or holy homeland and thus should be under the care of the Native peoples. Capitalist Euroamericans say the land is resource rich and highly productive or unproductive and therefore should be used in various ways: for human consumption or for waste dumps. Which group—Native Americans or Euroamericans— is the more politically motivated? Our representations of the world wield great power. By identifying Yucca Mountain as a wasteland we legitimate actions that turn it into a wasteland. When we fill it with high-level nuclear waste, our actions suggest a belief that the earth is inert (because we need it to be) despite our knowledge of its dynamism. We downplay or ignore knowledge of a huge regional aquifer, numerous shallow volcanic aquifers, earthquake activity, and potential volcanic activity. Even in this dry, quiet landscape with its dense enduring rock, water moves—in its various forms. And the materials we fill the rock with also move, change with time. Heat and gases are emitted from decaying radioisotopes, moisture accumulates, and canisters corrode. The systems ecologists were right about one thing: Nature is dynamic, and high-level radioactive waste won't disappear. Eventually, it will he recycled back into the "system." It will accumulate in animals and humans down the food chain. If industry and the military continue to produce radioactive elements such as plutonium, they will become lively agents in a new kind of system that includes the transuranic elements, if not those who unleashed them. What the systems theorists mistook was the extent to which humans could control the system. Control in the cybernetic sense is different from "working with." It is analogous to the human control of other humans as governors of slaves. Eventually, the slaves revolt, become free radicals. If we can learn anything from the Indian perspective in this region it is that we need to afford all things some degree of subjectivity. Even when today's scientists well understand the limits of "objectivity," Euroamerican culture—including scientists—continue to proceed as though humans live outside the world they attempt to manipulate and control. Control is not all bad. But the belief in the right to control an objectified Other is dangerously illusory. The experiment at Yucca Mountain, and the history of that region show the illusion (indeed, the fantasy) of control for what it is. Much like the "Sorcerer's Apprentice" of the Disney cartoon, the product of our meddling with forces we don't entirely understand escapes our control—multiplying and taking on a life of its own.

#### The AFF's attempt to unify nature around a “sustainable” solution to ecological catastrophe fantasises the existence of a singular, harmonious Nature, rather than coming to terms with the facticity of multiple, contingent Natures. This presupposition mandates the imagining of ecological Armageddon as a tactic to stave off a more vital project of reimagining our relationship to the Earth.

Swyngedouw 6

[Erik Swyngedouw, University of Manchester. “Impossible 'Sustainability' and the Post-Political Condition.” 2006. Also published in *The Sustainable Development Paradox: Urban Political Economy in the United States and Europe*. Eds. Rob J. Krueger and David Gibbs. New York: The Guilford Press, 2007. <[www.liv.ac.uk/geography/seminars/Sustainabilitypaper.doc](http://www.liv.ac.uk/geography/seminars/Sustainabilitypaper.doc)>.] // myost

Slavoj Žižek suggests in Looking Awry that the current ecological crisis is indeed a radical condition that not only constitutes a real and present danger, but, equally importantly, “questions our most unquestionable presuppositions, the very horizon of our meaning, our everyday understanding of ‘nature’ as a regular, rhythmic process” (Zizek, (1992) 2002: 34). It raises serious questions about what were long considered self-evident certainties. He argues that this fundamental threat to our deepest convictions of what we always thought we knew for certain about nature is co-constitutive of our general unwillingness to take the ecological crisis completely serious. It is this destabilising effect that explains “the fact that the typical, predominant reaction to it still consists in a variation of the famous disavowal, “I know very well (that things are deadly serious, that what is at stake is our very survival), but just the same I don’t really believe, … and that is why I continue to act as if ecology is of no lasting consequence for my everyday life” (page 35). The same unwillingness to question our very assumptions about what nature is (and even more so what natures might ‘become’) also leads to the typical obsessive reactions of those who DO take the ecological crisis seriously. Žižek considers both the case of the environmental activist, who in his or her relentless and obsessive activism to achieve a transformation of society in more ecologically sustainable ways expresses a fear that to stop acting would lead to catastrophic consequences. In his words, obsessive acting becomes a tactic to stave off the ultimate catastrophe, i.e. “if I stop doing what I am doing, the world will come to an end in an ecological Armageddon”. Others, of course, see all manner of transcendental signs in the ‘revenge of nature’, read it as a message that signals our destructive intervention in nature and urge us to change our relationship with nature. In other words, we have to listen to nature’s call, as expressed by the pending environmental catastrophe, and respond to its message that pleas for a more benign, associational relation with nature, a post-human affective connectivity, as a cosmopolitical “partner in dialogue”. While the first attitude radically ignores the reality of possible ecological disaster, the other two, which are usually associated with actors defending ‘sustainable’ solutions for our current predicament, are equally problematic in that they both ignore, or are blind to the inseparable gap between our symbolic representation (our understanding) of Nature and the actual acting of a wide range of radically different and, often contingent, natures. In other words, there is – of necessity – an unbridgeable gap, a void, between our dominant view of Nature (as a predictable and determined set of processes that tends towards a (dynamic) equilibrium – but one that is disturbed by our human actions and can be ‘rectified’ with proper sustainable practices) and the acting of natures as an (often) unpredictable, differentiated, incoherent, open-ended, complex, chaotic (although by no means unordered or un-patterned) set of processes. The latter implies the existence not only of many natures, but, more importantly, it also assumes the possibility of all sorts of possible future natures, all manner of imaginable different human-non human assemblages and articulations, and all kinds of different possible socio-environmental becomings. The inability to take ‘natures’ seriously is dramatically illustrated by the controversy over the degree to which disturbing environmental change is actually taking place and the risks or dangers associated with it. Lomborg’s The Sceptical Environmentalist captures one side of this controversy in all its phantasmagorical perversity (Lomborg, 1998), while climate change doomsday pundits represent the other. Both sides of the debate argue from an imaginary position of the presumed existence of a dynamic balance and equilibrium, the point of ‘good’ nature, but one side claims that the world is veering off the correct path, while the other side (Lomborg and other sceptics) argues that we are still pretty much on nature’s course. With our gaze firmly fixed on capturing an imaginary ‘idealised’ Nature, the controversy further solidifies our conviction of the possibility of a harmonious, balanced, and fundamentally benign ONE Nature if we would just get our interaction with it right, an argument blindly (and stubbornly) fixed on the question of where Nature’s rightful point of benign existence resides. This futile debate, circling around an assumedly centred, known, and singular Nature, certainly permits -- in fact invites -- imagining ecological catastrophe at some distant point (global burning (or freezing) through climate change, resource depletion, death by overpopulation). Indeed, imagining catastrophe and fantasising about the final ecological Armageddon seems considerably easier for most environmentalists than envisaging relatively small changes in the socio-political and cultural-economic organisation of local and global life here and now. Or put differently, the world’s premature ending in a climatic Armageddon seems easier to imagine (and sell to the public) than a transformation of (or end to) the neo-liberal capitalist order that keeps on practicing expanding energy use and widening and deepening its ecological footprint. It is this sort of considerations that led Slavoj Žižek controversially to state that “nature does not exist”. Of course, he does not imply that there are no such ‘things’ as quarks or other subatomic particles, black holes, tsunamis, sunshine, trees, or HIV viruses. Even less would he decry the radical effects of CO2 and other greenhouse gases on the climate or the lethal consequences of water contamination for the world’s poor. On the contrary, they are very real, many posing serious environmental problems, occasionally threatening entire populations (AIDS, for example), but he insists that the Nature we see and work with is necessarily radically imagined, scripted, symbolically charged; and is radically distant from the natures that are there, which are complex, chaotic, often unpredictable, often radically contingent, risky, patterned in endlessly complex ways, ordered along ‘strange’ attractors. In other words, there is no balanced, dynamic equilibrium based nature out there that needs or requires salvation in name of either Nature itself or of an equally imagined universal human survival. ‘Nature’ simply does not exist. There is nothing foundational in nature that needs, demands, or requires sustaining. The debate and controversies over nature and what do with it, in contrast, signals rather our political inability to engage in directly political and social argument and strategies about re-arranging the social co-ordinates of everyday life and the arrangements of socio-metabolic organisation (something usually called capitalism) that we inhabit. In order words, imagining a benign and ‘sustainable’ Nature avoids asking the politically sensitive, but vital, question as to what kind of socio-environmental arrangements do we wish to produce, how can this be achieved, and what sort of natures do we wish to inhabit.